COMMENT
AID TO EDUCATION, STUDENT UNREST, AND
CUTOFF LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW
Several years ago students in colleges and universities began to
protest with increasing frequency the ills of their institutions and
society. While campus protests had once been peaceful, in 1968 violent
disruption became commonplace, threatening the quality of higher education. Causes of the unrest were diffuse, the issues proclaimed by the
placards and shouts of bewildering variety, but often government itself
was the prime target. Students castigated government as the perpetrator of an immoral war, a grim reaper of youth, and a silent partner
in bigotry and repression.
In the face of rising disruption, the federal and state governments
attempted to restore order on campus by enacting many types of legislation. One of the most common removes public financial aid from
students involved in campus unrest.1 These cutoff statutes were passed
despite warnings by several independent sources. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Eisenhower
Commission), appointed by President Johnson, was the first to caution
against enacting financial cutoff statutes:
- A survey conducted by the Associated Press in mid-June 1970 revealed that 40
states considered legislation on campus unrest in their 1969 and 1970 legislative
sessions. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1970, § 2, at 41, col. 1. Six states defeated bills:
Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Vermont. Of the 34 remaining
states, most enacted various forms of criminal statutes which redefined traditional
crimes such as trespass, breach of the peace, or disorderly conduct in terms of campus
disturbance. E.g. CAL. PErAL CODE § 415.5 (West Supp. 1971) (disturbing peace of
state college or university) ; id. §§ 626.6, 626.8 (West 1970) (interference; disruption); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-8-21, 40-8-22 (Supp. 1969) (obstruction; trespass); IDAHo CoDE ANN. §§ 33-3715, 33-3716 (Supp. 1969) (obstruction; trespass);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:328, 14:329.5 (Supp. 1971) (obstruction or interference;
trespass); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 266, § 123 (Supp. 1970) (trespass); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-288.4(6) (1969)
(disorderly conduct); Onxo REv. CODEANN. § 2923.61
(Page Supp. 1970) (disruption); WASH. REv. CoD AN. §§ 28B.10.570 to 28B.10.573
(1970) (interference with or intimidation of an administrator, faculty member, or
student); Wis. STAT. AN. § 36.46 (Supp. 1971) ("campus misconduct"). A 'few
states passed general weapons control legislation, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-911
to 13-917.02 (Supp. 1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, §102B (Supp. 1970)
(Molotov cocktails); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-288.7, 14-288.8 (1969) ("weapon of
mass death and destruction," e.g., "bombs"), and some mentioned colleges, CAL.
PENAL CODE §626.9 (West Supp. 1971) (unauthorized possession of firearms on
school grounds); N.J. STAT. ANNx. § 2A :151-41.1 (1969) (possession of any firearm
in schools or colleges); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.05(10) (McKinney Supp. 1970)
(unauthorized possession of weapons in or upon buildings or grounds used for
educational purposes); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-141.1 (Supp. 1970) (unauthorized possession of firearms in schools or colleges) ;TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 295b (Supp.
1970) (interference by exhibiting or using firearms in schools or colleges). Most of
these statutes merely duplicated earlier general laws with a special campus analogue.
(1003)
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Existing laws already withdraw financial aid from
students who engage in disruptive acts. Additional laws
along the same lines would not accomplish any useful purpose.
We believe that the urge to enact additional legislation
should be turned into a channel that could assist the universities themselves to deal more effectively with the tactics
of obstruction.2
The Eisenhower Commission specifically recommended
that the American people do not let their understandable
resentment for the few students who foment and engage in
campus disorders lead them to support legislation or executive
action which would withhold financial aid from students or
universities.
The American Bar Association Commission on Campus Government and Student Dissent echoed 4 the concern of the Eisenhower
Commission and elaborated on one common failing of the statuteslack of a hearing meeting due process requirements before financial aid
is terminated.' Detailing a number of other deleterious effects of aidcutoff statutes-vagueness, coercion of schools to take disciplinary
action, and discrimination against needy and, possibly, less culpable
students 6 -the ABA Commission stated that it viewed "with deep
concern . . . statutes and proposals for terminating financial aid to
2

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, FINAL
(entitled To Establish Justice, To Ensure Domestic Tranquility)
[hereinafter cited as EISENHOWER COMMISSION REPORT].
The Eisenhower Commission went on to say:
There is a need for statutes authorizing universities, along with other affected
persons, to obtain court injunctions against willful private acts of physical
obstruction that prevent other persons from exercising their First Amendment
rights of speech, peaceable assembly, and petition for the redress of grievances.
Such laws would not be aimed at students exclusively, but at any willful
interference with First Amendment rights, on or off the campus, by students
or by non-students. They would also be available to uphold the First Amendment rights of students as well as other citizens.
Id.
A few states heeded these cautionary words in adopting their new criminal
statutes for campus situations and attempted: to redefine trustee powers to cope with
emergencies, Ch. 273 §§ 1-8, [1969] Ind. Acts 1136; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 334526
(Page Supp. 1970) ; to include authority to seek injunctive relief in a declared state
of emergency, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.18 (1969) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:329.6
(Supp. 1970) (state of emergency declared by local political subdivision); or even
to authorize special use of campus police, N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-10-17.1 (Supp. 1971).
REPORT 219 (1969)

3 EISENHOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 281.
4 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT DISSENT, REPORT 35 (1970).

5Id. 34.
6

Id. 33-35.
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students who engage in disruptive activities and to the universities
which they attend." '
Finally, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (the
Scranton Commission) concurred in the conclusions of both the
Eisenhower and ABA Commissions, unequivocally opposing further
financial cutoff legislation. In language equally applicable to much
state legislation, the Scranton Commission recommended:
New laws requiring termination of federally funded financial aid to those involved in campus disruption should not be
enacted; similar provisions in existing federal law should be
repealed or allowed to expire."
Financial cutoff legislation reversed a significant feature of federal
and state aid to higher education since World War II-program administration by recipient institutions without federal or state intrusion.
Often involving universities in the process of aid denial, the new cutoff
legislation altered the relationship between students and their institutions.
It is the thesis of this Comment that the cutoff statutes are infirm
on a number of grounds: the legislation was ambiguously drafted, based
on erroneous assumptions and therefore generally ineffective, and constitutionally unsound in many instances. Legislatures should now repeal those statutes which are permanent in nature and allow temporary
legislation to expire; in the event legislatures allow the statutes to remain, the courts should subject them to close scrutiny-as indeed it
appears they have begun to do. As a general expression of society's
distaste for violence, this legislation was an unfortunate choice. Now
that perspective is possible, these measures should be stricken from the
codes.
I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL AID TO EDUCATION

Substantial federal aid 9 to education originated in the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944,1" which rewarded those who had
served in World War II with unprecedented higher education opportunities. Extended to Korean War veterans,' benefits for returning
soldiers were supplemented by programs designed to provide the
scientists, technicians, and teachers necessary to American success in
7Id. 34.
8
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPus UNREsT, REPORT 221 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as SCRANTON COMMISSION REPORT].
9 See generally Comment, Higher Education and the Student Unrest Provisions,

31 Onio ST. LJ. 111 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Higher Education].
10 Ch. 268, tit. II, §§ 400-03, 58 Stat. 287.

1t Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, ch. 875, tit. II, §§ 201-74, 66

Stat. 663, as amended, Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, §§ 1601-69, 72 Stat.
1174 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1601-69 (1964)).
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the Cold War years. The programs provided funds to institutions for
buildings, equipment, and teachers to accommodate the influx of
students-as well as providing grants and loans to students.
The Higher Education Act of 1965,12 another important program,
revealed important changes in the federal government's conception of
aid to higher education. Instead of extending aid only to those who
had served or would serve the country in a relatively direct manner, the
Act recognized education as an essential opportunity which should be
available to all. Because mere access to college, even with financial
assistance, was inadequate absent effective preparatory schooling, the
Act also offered assistance to lower-level schools through programs
like Head Start. As with predecessor federal programs, and unlike
later legislation, the Higher Education Act of 1965 left primary responsibility for administering the programs with the individual educational institutions. 3
The turning point in the federal view of higher education assistance
occurred in 1968. The Higher Education Amendments of 1968 14 (the
1968 Act), incorporating an aid cutoff provision, carried the first
congressional response to the rising tide of campus disturbances-a
qualification which would continue throughout the next few years. As
a prototype of federal and state financial aid withdrawal legislation,
section 504 of the 1968 Act contained important and problematical
language, which will be extensively analyzed below:
(a) If an institution of higher education determines,
after affording notice and opportunity for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by, such institution, that such
individual has been convicted by any court of record of any
crime which was committed after [October 16, 1968] and
which involved the use of (or assistance to others in the use
of) force, disruption, or the seizure of property under control
of any institution of higher education to prevent officials
or students in such institution from engaging in their duties
or pursuing their studies, and that such crime was of a
serious nature and contributed to a substantial disruption of
the administration of the institution with respect to which
such crime was committed, then the institution which such
individual attends, or is employed by, shall deny for a period
of two years any further payment to, or for the direct benefit
12 Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-50 (Supp. V,
1970).
13 Higher Education, supra note 9, at 113-14.
14 Pub. L. No. 90-575, § 504, 82 Stat. 1062 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1060 (Supp.
V, 1970)).
A useful compilation of campus disturbances appears in STAFF OF PERMANENT
SuBcoMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE Co m. oN GOV'T OPERATIONS, 9 1 ST CONG.,
1sT SFss., STUDY OF CAMPus RIOTS AND DIsoRDERs, OCTOBER 1967-MAy 1969 (Comm.
Print 1969).
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of, such individual under any of the programs specified in
subsection (c) of this subsection. If an institution denies an
individual assistance under the authority of the preceding
sentence of this subsection, then any institution which such
individual subsequently attends shall deny for the remainder
of the two-year period any further payment to, or for the
direct benefit of, such individual under any of the programs
specified in subsection (c) of this subsection.
(b) If an institution of higher education determines,
after affording notice and opportunity for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by, such institution, that such
individual has willfully refused to obey a lawful regulation or
order of such institution after [October 16, 1960], and that
such refusal was of a serious nature and contributed to a
substantial disruption of the administration of such institution,
then such institution shall deny, for a period of two years,
any further payment to, or for the direct benefit of, such individual under any of the programs specified in subsection (c)
of this subsection.',
The last few words of subsections (a) and (b), by incorporating the
program reference list in subsection (c),' imposed their standards of
conduct on virtually every substantial federal aid program for students
at American higher education institutions.
States have also made substantial contributions to higher education, matching in amount federal monetary contributions to institutions
of higher learningY And as campus unrest has increased, state legislatures too have moved towards greater involvement in disciplining
students. Thirty-four of the forty states with legislative sessions in
1520 U.S.C. §§ 1060(a), (b) (Supp. V, 1970). A proviso adds that the section
is not to be construed to limit student free expression. Id. § 1060(d) (3).
3.
d. § 1060(c) stipulated the programs affected by the new eligibility require-

ment: the student loan program under title II of the National Defense Education

Act of 1958, the fellowship program under titles IV and VI of the same act, and all
of the programs applicable to colleges under the Higher Education Act of 1965.
Cf. Complaint at 6-10, United States Nat'l Student Ass'n v. Finch, Civil No. 970-69
(D.D.C., filed Apr. 16, 1969).
.7JOmT EcONOMIc CoMMITTEE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESs., THE ECONOMICS AND
FINANCING OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (Jt. Comm. Print
1969). In the years 1965-1966, for example, state, local, and federal governments
contributed over $6.1 billion or 47.8% of the total income for all institutions of

higher education. State and local governments contributed 55% of the total governmental aid. The major differentiation between federal and state contributions is thus
not in volume of expenditure but in the type of institution assisted. Federal funds
divide almost evenly between public and private institutions, but 97.4% of state and
local aid goes to public institutions. See id. In more recent years, state and local
governments have increased their contributions faster than the federal government.
In fiscal 1967, the state and local governments gave 64.8% of the total, 63.2% including
construction funds. By fiscal 1969, the state and local share had risen to 66.1%,
68.1% with construction included. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 336 (1971)
(appendi: I).
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1969 and 1970 enacted campus unrest legislation, usually in the form
of criminal-trespass, breach-of-the-peace, or disorderly-conduct statutes,
or weapons-control acts. 8 At least eleven states have specifically chosen
to use the sanction of withdrawing financial aid from students or higher
educational institutions."
Since both state and federal enactments
provide extensive financial aid to higher education, potential loss of
assistance from either source may have a significant impact upon student
and college finances. Because state provisions are too numerous for
individual treatment, they will generally be treated here in the context
of problems raised by analogous federal legislation.
It is questionable whether the federal legislation, and even more so
whether certain state legislation, is constitutional. But it seems clear
that the legislation is undesirable, even if the statutory weaknesses do
not rise to constitutional dimensions. Vagueness, for example, has a
constitutional aspect which may invalidate statutory language, but short
of that limit vagueness may lead to administrative difficulties which
should independently influence legislative policy. The next two sections
will treat the wisdom of financial cutoff legislation from two perspectives; the final section will analyze the legislation's constitutional
ramifications.
II.

AMBIGUOUS AND UNADMINISTRABLE

STATUTES

A. Comprehensive Cutoff Statutes
1. Ambiguous Trigger Mechanisms
Initially, it is striking that conviction of a crime is so often used
to trigger aid withdrawal. The most recurrent crimes in a demonstration situation are probably trespass and disorderly conduct, or their
local equivalents. Although use of criminal conviction provides a
definite event to trigger aid termination, qualifications upon the type
of crime, as in section 504(a), introduce a large degree of uncertainty
into the determination of when aid withdrawal is required.
Assuming knowledge of a criminal conviction, under section
504(a) a university must determine whether the crime "involved the
use of . . . force, disruption, or the seizure of [school] property
. . , was of a serious nature and contributed to a substantial disruption . . . . "
The court of conviction may have made none of
'8 See note 1 supra.
'9 California, note 25 infra; Florida, note 21 infra; Illinois, ILL. ANN.

STAT.

ch.

122, § 30-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); Iowa, Act of June 21, 1969, ch. 48, § 8,

[1969] Iowa Acts 54; Michigan, Appropriation for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970,

Pub. Act No. 307, §17, [1969] Mich. Acts 587-88 (Aug. 12, 1969); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 116-174.2 (Supp. 1969); New York, N.Y. EDuc. LAw §6450
(McKinney Supp. 1970) ; Ohio, OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 3345.23 (Page Supp. 1970) ;
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5104.1, 5158.1 (Supp. 1970); Washington,
note 23 infra; Wisconsin, note 26 infra.
2020 U.S.C. §1060(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
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these determinations. The university that must make these separate
findings is probably less able to ascertain the meanings of critical statutory language than a court accustomed to construing the law. The
term "disruption" may encompass a broad range of activity-for example, mere inconvenience of administering a college classroom or
office. Moreover, the offense must involve the "use of disruption" as
well as contribute to a "substantial disruption."
On the state level, equally vague definitions of misconduct pervade
both those statutes that require conviction before aid removal and those
that do not. Florida has one of the most general definitions: participation "in disruptive activities," with no further explanation.21 It
appears that participation in a fraternity prank qualifies.' Washington
has a broad definition with little elaboration. 3 Illinois revokes assistance for participation "in any disorderly disturbance or course of conduct directed against the administration or policies" of the educational
institution but excludes constitutionally protected acts 2
California 2
and two almost identical Wisconsin sections 26 attempt the most ex21

F"p. STAT. ANN. § 239.581(2) (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added):
After it has been determined that a student or employee of a state institution
of higher learning has participated in disruptive activities, the following
penalties may be imposed against such a person:
(a) Immediate termination of contract of such employee . . .
(b) Immediate expulsion of such student from the institution of higher
learning for a minimum of two years.
Actual aid termination after expulsion would result from a school recommendation to
terminate. Id. § 239.50.
22
See S. REP. No. 1387, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968).
23 WAsH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 28B.10.281 (1970):
Any student who organizes and/or participates in any demonstration, riot or
other activity of which the effect is to interfere with or disrupt the normal
educational process at such institution shall not be eligible for such aid.
2
AILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §30-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
25 CAL. E uc. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1970) (emphasis added):

Any recipient of such state financial aid who, on the campus of the university, college, or other institution of higher education, willfully and knowingly commits any act likely to disrupt the peaceful conduct of the activities
of such campus, and is arrested and convicted of a public offense arising from
such act, may be determined to be ineligible for any such state financial aid
for a period not to exceed the ensuing two academic years.
Any recipient of such state financial aid who, after a hearing, is found to
have willfully and knowingly disrupted the orderly operation of the campus,
but has not been arrested and convicted, may be determined to be ineligible
for any state financial aid for such period as the hearing board may determine,
not to exceed the ensuing two academic years.
26

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.46 (Supp. 1970):
(1) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Campus misconduct" means a crime or offense involving the use of
or assistance to others in the use of force, disruption, or the seizure of
property under control of any state or private institution of higher education
with intent to prevent students or employes [sic] at the institution from
engaging in their duties or pursuing their studies, where such offense was of
a serious nature and contributed to a substantial disruption of the adminis-
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tensive definition of misconduct. All three contain the significant requirement of intent, absent from other statutes."
Ohio defines prohibited conduct in a unique manner by incorporating numerous sections
of the Ohio Code," including a section passed contemporaneously which
created the crime of disruption."9
The consequent interpretive problems are aggravated when, as
required by section 504 (a), the crime effectuated by disruption must be
"of a serious nature," 30 clearly another difficult determination. In
deciding whether a crime is serious, should the institution view the
particular acts from a societal context or in connection with the particular incident at the university? An occurrence of vital importance to
an institution may be relatively insignificant to society. Or, perhaps,
"of a serious nature" is simply meant to modify "crime." Under this
interpretation the university must determine where the offense in question ranks in the hierarchy of criminal law.
2. Breach of University Rules as a Trigger
Section 504(b) does not suffer from some of the ambiguities and
potential problems which afflict section 504(a) and similar state
statutes. Under section 504(b), the problem of institutional responsibility for receiving information from courts or students is diminished
because the standard of conduct is violation of a university regulation.
Although this removes some of the factfinding difficulties resulting from
vague statutory terms, interpretive problems remain. The omnipresent
term-disruption-is used, and its limits are no more sharply defined
in the context of section 504(b) than they were under section 504(a).
And, again, the disruption must be of a serious nature.
An additional grave danger of section 504(b) is that, by incorporating university rules, federal aid removal adds a penalty to university regulations not necessarily designed to entail such serious consetration of the institution. This includes, without restriction because of
enumeration, the use of force with intent to cause disruption of class attendance or normal pedestrian or vehicular traffic to and from university buildings,
classrooms, administrative or professional offices or athletic facilities.
Wis. STAT. ANN. §36.43(1) (Supp. 1970) requires conviction of a crime and
has virtually the same effective language but omits the words "with intent," and has
telescoped the hearing and period of ineligibility provisions. Section 36.43(2),
however, requires only willful violation of a university regulation or order and has

abbreviated its standard of conduct to "refusal [which is] of a serious nature and
contributed to a substantial disruption of the administration of such institution . . .
Section 36.43 copies the language of §§504(a) and (b) of the Higher Education
Act of 1968, quoted in text accompanying note 15 supra.
27 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1970), quoted in part in note 25 supra;
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§36.46(1) (a), 36.43(1), (2) (Supp. 1970), quoted in part in
note 26 supra.
28 OHiao REv. CODE ANN. § 3345.23 (Page Supp. 1970).
2
9Id.
§ 2923.61.
3020 U.S.C. §1060(a) (Supp. V, 1970); Wis.

STAT.

ANN. §§36.46(1) (a), (2)
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quences 3 1 The step of removing aid should not be taken for violation
of certain minor regulations. Universities might have a variety of
regulations covering the most puerile offenses. Common are broad
catch-all rules for "conduct unbecoming a student." 3 Combining such
rules with university authorities' possible opinion that any rule violation
should be considered serious or disruptive manifests an obvious
danger." This possibility is even more troublesome because the determination of violation under section 504(b) is made by the same party
who formulated the rule, who presumably has an interest in rule enforcement, and who may even feel public and political pressure to punish
student disrupters to avoid publicity and financial reprisal.3
Fortunately, the pressure of federal and state bills keyed to university
regulations, court insistence on greater clarity of substantive rules and
procedures, and student-faculty awareness of the need for fairness in
university discipline have prompted numerous reforms in university
and college conduct rules and disciplinary procedures.3 5 Even the most
enlightened reform has, however, an additional dysfunction: where new
regulations are enacted, the danger exists that commission of offenses
not contemplated by Congress will result in loss of aid.
The problems raised by section 504(b) carry over to a number
of state statutes. Although most states require at least conviction
before financial aid is terminated, Florida,3 6 Washington,3 7 and
Illinois 38 require no court action at all. Violation of institutional rules
31 S. REP. No. 1387, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968).
32
SCRANTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 128; see, e.g., Soglin v.
Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1969), aff'g 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis.
1968); University of Pennsylvania, Student Handbook 3 (Sept. 1970).
33 An HEW survey published in 1969, OFFICE OF EDuc., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDuc. & WELFARE, SURVEY (1969), indicates either a predisposition by universities
to act under their own regulations, or possibly an inability to assimilate the new
federal standards. The survey results may also be indicative of a more authoritarian
attitude by universities in cases of rule violations. Cf. Complaint at 10, United States
Nat'l Student Ass'n v. Finch, Civil No. 970-69 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 16, 1969).

3

4 See MICHIGAN STATE SENATE COMM. TO INVESTIGATE CAMPUS DISORDERS &
STUDENT UNREST, FINAL STAFF REPORT, PART TWo, SPECIAL TASK REPORT 68 (1970) ;
cf. Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1125 (2d Cir. 1970), noted in 39
FORDHAm L. REV. 127 (1970).
35
;

See

OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE

UNIVERSITIES & LAND-GRANT COLLEGES, CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGES TO EASE CAMPUS
TENSIONS (1970) (cataloguing new campus regulations at numerous colleges and
universities) ; cf. SCRANTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 129-31. See also
C. BLOCKER, OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Enuc. & WELFARE, DISSENT
AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT IN REVOLT (1969) (appendix containing model disciplinary

code).
30 F" STAT. AiNN. § 239.581 (Supp. 1970), quoted in part in note 21 supra.
Though an expulsion statute, it wvas enacted during the flood of cutoff provisions,
and, since expulsion results in aid removal, id. § 239.50, it wvill be treated as a cutoff
statute.
3
7WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.10281 (1970), quoted in note 23 supra.
3

8

Ir.. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 30-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
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triggers four provisions " that are also triggered by conviction. The
California and Ohio provisions require eventual conviction, but permit
suspension upon arrest.'
3. Institutional Obligations to Seek and Disseminate Information
Cutoff legislation is often ambiguous in delineating the degree to
which the university must seek and disseminate information regarding
student misconduct. For example, under section 504(a), the institution must first discover that the student has been convicted of an appropriate crime. The Ohio cutoff statute facilitates discovery by requiring police officials and courts to notify educational institutions of
court actions. 41 But section 504(a), and some state statutes that
require conviction to terminate aid, are silent as to how the university
receives notice of a criminal conviction. Equally uncertain is whether
the institution has an affirmative duty to seek such information from
courts or the students themselves.
The extent of the university's obligation to report student misconduct is also obscure. Only certain statutes clearly require reports to
governmental agencies.42 This is significant because many statutes,
including section 504(a), require that institutions where a student
enrolls subsequent to aid termination at a previous institution must also
deny aid. Without an effective reporting system, enforcement of this
provision may be haphazard.
Those statutes that do require reporting raise a different problem.
Reports to outsiders alter the nature of the student-institution relationship. The school can no longer guarantee the student confidentiality
and therefore loses some of the basis for its claim to student confidence.
4. Institutional Penalties
Although enacted federal legislation on campus unrest may create
informational and administrative difficulties for institutions, none previously discussed here have exacted financial penalties from the institutions themselves. Of the bills proposed in the Ninety-first Congress,
however, the largest group made this extension of federal financial retraction. The bills generally would have eliminated federal aid to
39 CAL. EDuc. CoDE § 31291 (West Supp. 1970), quoted in part in note 25 supra;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5104.1 (a) (2), 5158.1 (a) (2) (Supp. 1971); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§36.46(2)(b), 36.43(2) (Supp. 1970), quoted in part in note 26 supra;
Appropriation for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970, Pub. Act No. 307, § 17, [1969]
Mich. Acts 587-88 (Aug. 12, 1969) ; cf. Complaint at 10-11, United States Nat'l Student
Ass'n v. Finch, Civil No. 970-69 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 16, 1969) (presence of both criminal conviction and university regulation "triggers" in one statute invidiously discriminates).
40 Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 3345.22 (Page Supp. 1970) ; CAL. EDuc. CODE § 31291
(West Supp. 1970) (suspension), quoted in part in note 25 supra.
41 Onio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3345.22(B) (Page Supp. 1970).
42
See IlN. ANN. STAT. § 28-5764(b) (Supp. 1967); Appropriation for Fiscal
Year Ending June 30, 1970, Pub. Act No. 307, § 17, [1969] Mich. Acts 587-88 (Aug.
12, 1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5104.1(b) (Supp. 1971).
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educational institutions which failed to discipline students under existing
federal statutes within a reasonable time. Of this group of twenty-one
proposals, eleven specified that disruptive teachers would also be denied
federal assistance. Four bills conditioned federal aid upon maintenance
of a particular program, such as ROTC or defense-related research.4 3
One recent law, the 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Act, did
withhold funds from:
Any institution of higher learning if the Secretary of Defense
. . . determines that at the time of expenditure of the funds
. . . recruiting personnel of any of the Armed Forces of the

United States are being barred by the policy of such institution from [its] premises [with special exceptions for critical
research] .44

A more ominous sign was the report of the House Armed Services
Committee on the bill, in which the Committee warned it would suggest
more restrictive legislation "unless the Secretary of Defense can implement a procedure by which defense research funds are denied to [disrupted universities] ." 45
On the state level, a New York statute requires colleges under
state supervision or charter to formulate rules of student conduct and
file them with the state within ninety days and denies state assistance
to any institution that does not comply.40 A similar statute in California,
requiring the Board of Regents (which governs that state's colleges) to
formulate rules, does not penalize the educational institution .4 The
existence of student codes gives clearer notice of offensive conduct and
its consequences and should be commended as a stimulus for productive
reform of university discipline.4" Student codes do assist the creation
of-as the California legislature sought-"a coherent, fair, and uniform
system of discipline." 4 The sanction of the New York provision is,
however, unnecessarily severe. Failure to file rules or report action
may indicate only inability to create rules quickly or may merely reflect
the general administrative tardiness of higher educational institutions. 0°
43 See K. Haley, Legislation and Proposals in the Ninety-First Congress Relating
to Student Financial Aid and Campus Disorders 10-20 (Legislative Reference Service
of the Library of Congress, Pub. No. 70-153 ED, 1970).
44Act of Oct. 7, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-441, §510, 84 Stat. 914.
45
H.R. REP. No. 1022, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). The Scranton Commission specifically disapproved of this threatened action. Text accompanying note 8
srupra.
46 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6450 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
47 CAL. EDUC. CODE §22635 (West Supp. 1971).
48 SCRANTON CommIssioN REPORT, supra note 8, at 128; see text accompanying
notes 32-35 supra.

49 Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1427, § 6, [1969] Cal. Laws 2932.

OAn example of counterproductive use of the New York statute is the criminal
prosecution of Hobart College which filed regulations as required. On June 5,
1970, a police raid led by an alleged police undercover agent who had spent much
time on campus so angered students that a crowd vandalized police cars, imprisoning
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B. Since 1968: Appropriation and Authorization Riders
Despite its significance as prototype legislation, the 1968 Act was
ineffective in stemming campus unrest. Disruption was neither deterred nor abated.51 The Act itself was applied to few students. In the
academic year of 1968-1969 only eleven institutions terminated any
federal aid under the Act: those proceedings affected sixty-three students under section 504(a) and twenty-six students under section
504(b). Yet, nearly seventy institutions, under their own regulations,
cut off aid from 586 students.5" While Congressmen may be correct
in suggesting that institutions simply would not apply the statutes out
of weakness 3 and were aided in noncompliance by confused HEW
interpretations that permitted evasion," an equally plausible explanation
is that the institutions, rather, could not assimilate the novel and bewildering standards. If federal standards of conduct do not or cannot
work, Congress itself must accept partial blame. Perhaps the failure is
best indicated by the later enactment of additional federal and state
legislation.
The recurrent phenomenon of campus unrest had become alarming,
a source of growing public concern. Insistent constituents or Congressmen's own alarm may explain why Congress has acted repeatedly since
1968 to stem campus disorder by threatening to cut federal aid, legislating in a way that has only compounded the problems already present
in the 1968 Act.
policemen until arrested students were released. The college was prosecuted for first
degree coercion N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.65 (McKinney 1967), the offense of inducing
an official to "[viiolate his duty as a public servant" Id. Since the college was
prosecuted on a theory that its officials accepted students' demands and urged police
to comply, the college's own regulations were introduced by the prosecution as
evidence that the college was ignoring its own rules against student disorder. N.Y.
Times,
Feb. 4, 1971, at 15, col. 5.
51
See STAFF OF PERUSANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMM. ON
GOV'T OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY OF CAMPUS RIOTS AND DISORDERSOCTOBER 1967-MAY 1969 (Comm. Print 1969).
52 OFFICE OF EDUc., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUc. & WELFARE, SURVEY (1969).
5 See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 21,633 (1969)
(remarks of Representative Sikes
during debates on Dep'ts of Labor & Health, Educ. & Welfare appropriations act for
1970).
54 1d. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare initially indicated that
institutions had discretion to proceed with determinations under the statute. Office
of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Higher Education Reports, Jan. 28,
1969, at 3. Later this interpretation was reversed and institutions were required to
initiate aid cutoff determinations within the bounds of good faith on their own part.
Bureau of Higher Educ., Memorandum XII, June 20, 1969, at 1. This interpretation,
however, misconstrued testimony by then Secretary Finch. Hearings on Campus
Unrest Before the Special Subcoinm. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 534 (1969) (statement of Robert H. Finch, Sec'y of Health, Educ.
& Welfare) ; see Note, Federal Aid to Education: Campus-Unrest Riders, 22 STAN.
L. Rav. 1094, 1097 n.17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Federal Aid]. Secretary Finch's
distinction between §504(a) as mandatory and §504(b) as discretionary, Hearings
on Campus Unrest Before the Special Subcomin. of the House Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 534-35 (1969), has, however, no support in the language of those sections. Educational institution confusion in the face of such shifting
interpretation of already vague statutory language, see text accompanying notes 20-42
supra, seems understandable.
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The initial error was the type of subsequent legislation Congress
chose to use." Whatever the defects of the 1968 Act, its measures
represented long-term legislation operating under standards which
eventually could be assimilated through constant application. By contrast, seven of the nine federal student unrest provisions enacted since
the Higher Education Act of 1965, and two state unrest laws, have been
riders to appropriation bills. Several significant consequences result
from this departure from comprehensive legislation. Appropriation acts
expire within one year, but riders attached to them are effective until all
the money appropriated is spent. 6 Hence, regardless of the substantive
provisions of the riders, the administration of them is a definite problem.
Before it can make the appropriate factual determinations, a university
must trace the source of funds involved in an individual student's case
to the particular program and then to the correct appropriation bill.
Even if tracing can be accomplished, any program administered under
successive appropriations encounters absurdly complex administrative
difficulties whenever the language of successive riders differs in any
material fashion. Consider the following illustration:
[T]he 1969 appropriation Act for the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), which contains an unrest
rider, section 411, funds higher educational programs primarily for the period from July 1, 1968, through June 30,
1969. To fund the same programs for the next fiscal year,
Congress passed another appropriation Act containing a different unrest rider, section 407. But the passage of the new
act and rider does not cancel the operation of the previous
unrest rider, section 411. If after June 30, 1969, the expiration date of the 1969 appropriation Act, a university were
still spending moneys funded under the 1969 Act, section 411
should still apply."7
The only possible escape from this analytical maze is to spend money
as quickly as it is appropriated.
These cumbersome federal riders can be classified into three broad
categories: those which permit administration by the school; those
which appear to be self-executing, that is, which operate automatically
upon conviction of a crime; and those which are independent because
they set up a distinct standard for aid termination.5" Despite language
differences among the individual riders or among the suggested groups,
the administrative burdens of all three must be borne primarily by the
55 At least two states, Iowa and Michigan, have also enacted cutoff legislation in
the form of appropriation bill riders. Act of June 21, 1969, ch. 48, § 8, [1969] Iowa
Acts 54 (biennial appropriation for Board of Regents for July 1, 1969, through June
30, 1971) ; Appropriation for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970, Pub. Act. No. 307,

§ 17, [1969] Mich. Acts 587-88 (Aug. 12, 1969).
5 Federal Aid, supra note 54, at 1096.
-7Id. (citations omitted).
58 Id.1096-101.
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educational institutions. A corresponding monitoring burden arises in
the executive departments which disburse the appropriations to their
respective programs. In short, classification cannot be made so neatly
when the practical administrative effects, as distinguished from semantic
variations, of the riders are adequately considered. Nevertheless, the
suggested groupings are useful for discussion.
Two provisions in the school-administered group '9 adopted the
entire language of section 504 of the 1968 Act 6 and two adopted the
language of section 504(b) only. 6' This group suffers from the same
problems already discussed under the 1968 Act.
Three measures form the self-executing group.6 Their riders
provide that:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be
used to provide a loan, guarantee of a loan or a grant to any
applicant who has been convicted by any court of general
jurisdiction of any crime which involves the use of or the
assistance to others in the use of force, trespass or the seizure
of property under control of an institution of higher education
to prevent officials or students at such an institution from
engaging in their duties or pursuing their studies. 3
As under section 504(a), punishment is triggered by conviction of a
crime meeting additional statutory criteria.6" A major difference from
section 504(a) is that the caveats of "a serious nature" and "substantial disruption" have been omitted from the description of the offense.
Instead, there is a more detailed description of proscribed behavior.
And, unlike section 504 (a), the statutory language of the self-executing
group makes no provision for notice of charges or opportunity for
hearing. The failure to provide a specific time limit on disability is not
59The school-administered group consists of: the National Science Foundation
Authorization Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-120, §7, 83 Stat. 203-04; the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-119,
§ 7, 83 Stat. 201-02; the Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban
Development Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-550, 82 Stat. 946; and the
Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-126, 83 Stat. 230. The year designations in authorizations acts refer to the fiscal year for which the funds are appropriated, not the year
of enactment as in other legislation.
I0National Science Foundation Authorization Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-120,
§ 7, 83 Stat. 203-04; National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization
Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-119, § 7, 83 Stat. 201-02.
O Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development
Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-126, 83 Stat. 230; Independent Offices and
Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L.
No. 90-550, 82 Stat. 946.
62Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-171, § 641,
83 Stat. 486; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-580,
§540, 82 Stat. 1136; Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare
Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 411, 82 Stat. 995.
63Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-171, § 641,
83 Stat. 486; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-580,
§540, 82 Stat. 1136; Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare
Appropriation Act, 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 411, 82 Stat. 995.
64See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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too serious since riders expire when all appropriated money has been
expended, but this time-uncertainty is the core of an administrative maze
noted earlier.' What appears to distinguish the self-executing group,
and provides the name, is that the force of statutory language and the
absence of any reference to educational institutions' administrative
capacity implies executive department supervision.6 6 But the agencies
themselves have rejected this role,67 thus placing the burden on the
school. It is also unclear whether universities have solicitation and
reporting functions apart from the determination whether to remove
aid. One possible interpretation is that while the executive agencies
delegate the factfinding to the institutions, the executive departments
will not require reporting among institutions that a particular student
has been denied aid. Since the executive department has responsibility
for disbursing funds, it might require only one-way reporting. As each
institution removed aid from a student under a particular rider, that
action would be reported to the agency. The agency would then have
responsibility for either refusing funds under that or any similar rider
to an institution where the student subsequently enrolled or notifying all
institutions receiving restricted funds of the identity of all disqualified
students. Certainly the self-executing group encounters as many difficulties as the 1968 Act or the school-administered group.
The final group of federal riders contains two enactments,68 both
for fiscal 1970. Both provide that funds shall not be given to one
who has engaged in conduct on or after August 1, 1969, which
involves the use of (or the assistance to others in the use of)
force or the threat of force or the seizure of property under
the control of an institution of higher education, to require
or prevent the availability of certain curriculum, or to require
or prevent the faculty, administrative officials or students in
such institution from engaging in their duties or pursuing
studies at such institution ....
65

See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
66 Federal Aid, supra note 54, at 1098-99.
67M.; see, e.g., Hearings on Problems of Higher Education, Including Those

Relating to Student Financial Assistance, Particularly in Regard to the Eligibility
Provisions of Section .504 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968, Before the
House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172-73 (1969) (letter from
Robert H. Finch to Presidents of Universities, Colleges, Junior Colleges, and ComColleges).
munity
6
sDepartments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-204, § 407, 84 Stat. 48; Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appro-

priation Act, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-153, § 706, 83 Stat. 427.
691d. There is a proviso that:
[s]uch limitation upon the use of money appropriated in this Act shall not
apply to a particular individual until the appropriate institution of higher
education at which such conduct occurred shall have had an opportunity to
initiate or has completed such proceedings as it deems appropriate but which
are not dilatory in order to determine whether the provisions of this limitation upon the use of appropriated funds shall apply . ...
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In defining prohibited activity, the third group appears to reach the
same activity as the other two groups despite slightly different language
on threats and preventing curriculum availability. While this language
initially differs from the first and second group in only minor respects,
the third group is termed independent because its riders define prohibited conduct without regard to any external standard such as conviction of a crime or violation of a university rule. As long as these
other standards exist in separate, applicable statutes, this approach
merely adds another determination that must be made, and increases
the institution's burden in administering possibly overlapping statutes.
This multiplicity of standards, which riders compound, is a final
weakness of cutoff legislation. It is possible for a student to receive aid
simultaneously under various federal and state programs. The number
of different statutes applicable in a given case, when combined with the
problems of ambiguity and the number of institutions involved, poses a
real danger of varying enforcement of a given statute by different
institutions.
III. ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS
Thus far, we have focused on the ambiguities and administrative
burdens created by cutoff statutes. A complementary nonconstitutional
criterion by which this legislation should be tested is whether it deals
effectively with the target evil--campus disruption. The judgment
whether a statute is to be enacted or retained should be reached by balancing the costs to society of administering it against the benefits it
produces.
Whether cutoff legislation deals effectively with campus disruption
can be gauged in two ways. First, one can attempt to ascertain the
causes of unrest and judge whether existing legislation is likely to
eradicate them, and so prevent future disruptions. Second, without
examining causes, one can review empirical data to ascertain whether
unrest has declined as a result of previous enactments and attempt to
predict from this data the likelihood of such effects in the future.
Stating the causes of unrest is, of course, a complex task--one not
undertaken here. What can be said about financial cutoff legislation is
that the sanction is inappropriate in view of the explanation of campus
unrest most commonly expressed by legislators. The ostensible targets
of the legislation are those students who instigate and participate in
campus disorders. The frequently articulated premise of legislators is
that disorders are directly traceable to the activities of a small minority
of activists.7 0 Usually these activists are assumed to be students at the
particular educational institution. Characterizations of them are sometimes rather harsh: "professional troublemakers with Communist
affiliations." 71
70 E.g, 115 CONG. REc. 21,635 (1969) (remarks of Representative Riegle).
" 1 Id. 21,633 (remarks of Representative Sikes).
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If the leader theory is valid, then the effectiveness of financial cutoff legislation is doubtful. The Scranton Commission found a positive
correlation between wealth and political activism:
The college students among whom the youth culture and
campus unrest emerged were principally those from affluent
families, whose parents were [liberal and educated] .7
Therefore, the radical activists identified as the essential problem are
the students least likely to be receiving federal or state assistance. The
implications of this finding for legislatures considering remedial legislation were pointed out by Dr. Bruno Bettelheim. Testifying before
Congress, using statistics compiled from the San Francisco State College disturbances in 1969, Dr. Bettelheim stressed that:
even to cut out subsidies would not help, because very few of
those of the radical left who are the leaders really receive
subsidies; they are subsidized by their families.'
The purpose of the legislation discussed here is to prohibit financial
assistance to radical troublemakers. But the coalescence of the leader
theory of campus disorders with the positive correlation between affluence and activism implies that the desired targets of the legislation
are the people least likely to be affected by it. If the leader theory is
valid, the legislation misses its mark so frequently as to make unwarranted the cost of punishing less-involved students.
A variation of the leader theory is that the leaders are not really
students at all, or at least not students at the particular university. This
theory often emphasizes the role of identifiable, ostensibly revolutionary
groups.74 But the legislation is aimed at students at the institution, and
outsiders are, by definition, not affected. Legislators seriously advocating the outsider theory may really intend to discipline the radicals, but
their legislation punishes only resident students who have followed
along.73
These theories of campus unrest articulated by legislators, thus,
can hardly support financial cutoff statutes. A third theory of campus
72 SCRANTON CommIssIoN REPORT,

supra note 8, at 71 (emphasis added).

73 Hearingson Campus Unrest Before the Special Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Educ. & Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 263 (1969) ; see id. 285; id. 534 (testimony
of Robert Finch, Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
74 Representative Clark has stated:
[T]here are about 80 to 120 SDS's [sic] that are going from one end of the
country to the other ....
These are the ones who are the crux of the whole situation that we find
in our universities today.
115 CONG. REc. 21,638 (1969).
75
Conceivably, outsiders who were students could be disciplined by their own
educational institution. But that institution's rules or regulations would have to
encompass activity away from the campus, an unlikely and possibly overbroad position.
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unrest, however, based on the participation of large numbers of relatively moderate students, provides at least a superficially rational basis
for such legislation. Although a small group may organize and lead
some demonstrations, only massive student movements can support
protests of such size as the tremendous upswellings of sentiment that
closed one-third of the nation's higher educational institutions in the
spring of 1970. Large demonstrations, such as those at Berkeley in
1964, and Columbia in 1968 and 1970, could not occur without the
support of many moderate students. 6 This moderate student group,
willing to join on occasion with extremist tactics or issues, usually contains a significant segment of the college student population. One study
has estimated that forty percent of all college students may constitute a
so-called "involved minority," sensitive to social problems and approving civil disobedience but not violencey Since this group is large and
diverse, many of its members are likely to be receiving financial aid, and
cutoff legislation might be an effective deterrent to disruptive activities.
The Scranton Commission concluded, however, that neither the
moderate-student nor the leader theory was sufficient to explain all
campus protests.78 Opponents of the legislation have even suggested
that cutoff legislation may radicalize the moderate elements of university
student bodies 7 9-a theme echoed by three separate commissions.8"
If the moderate-student theory does account for a significant part
of campus disorder, then financial cutoff legislation may find its mark.
The fact that the culprit is punished, however, does not establish the
wisdom of the punishment. Given the existence of feasible alternatives,
such as leaving all disciplinary matters to the discretion of the institution,"' unfairness and ineffectiveness make financial cutoff statutes
undesirable.
Financial cutoff statutes are unfair and ineffective because the
punishment fits, not the crime, but the wealth of the offender. In some
cases the statute is unduly severe and in other cases unduly lax. Although direct responsibility for disruption seemingly should produce a
proportionate penalty in the form of appropriately severe aid termination, instead a wealthy student encounters no financial penalty since he
probably receives no aid anyway. Even if a wealthy student did receive
some aid, the size of his loss is likely to be less; and even if it is the
same in absolute terms, the loss will bear less heavily upon him. And
76 See SCRANTON

CommiSSIoN

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 24.

'7 STAFF REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCE-MENT TO THE
NATIONAL CO IISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, LAW AND
ORDER RECONSIDERED 215 (1969).
78 SCRANTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 27, 53-54.
79 E.g., 115 CONG. REC. 21,640-41 (1969) (remarks of Representative RailsbaCk);
id. 21,641 (remarks of Representative Frey) ; id. 21,648-49 (remarks of Representative
Steiger).
S0 See text accompanying notes 2-8 supra.

81

See S. REP. No. 1387, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968).
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a wealthier student completely cut off from governmental aid usually
has greater access to financial help from relatives or lending institutions.
By contrast, for the disadvantaged student, denial of federal or
state financial aid may be a critical determination, completely precluding
further education. Punishment by financial cutoff is harsher upon precisely those whom the legislation has attempted to assist: the poor
student and the minority group student.'
This shift in educational
policy has been decried4 by a few legislators s3 and condemned by the
Scranton Commission."
That large numbers of students are involved in disorders suggests
that legislators should concern themselves with the rehabilitative implications of the type of punishment chosen. An arsonist or a bomber may
properly be both expelled from school and convicted of a felony. But
when sufficiently large numbers of students are involved in less serious
offenses, society should, in addition to devising some punishment, attempt to solve the causes of the unrest, in order to benefit itself. Cutting
off financial aid may terminate a student's education and render him a
less productive citizen.
This result is particularly unattractive since there are less damaging alternatives available. If aid cutoff for misbehavior is left to institutional discretion, where some maintain it belongs, 5 it is at least
theoretically possible for the institution to distinguish those students
who will benefit from a second chance from those who are likely to
misbehave again. Under many cutoff statutes, termination is mandatory. The arbitrariness of such a procedure seems unwise, and may
only encourage evasion of the statutes by concerned institutions.
The second test of cutoff legislation suggested above is to examine
available data to determine whether potential aid loss has, in fact,
stemmed disruption. It is probably too early to pass judgment on the
legislation's ultimate effectiveness, but present evidence and forecasts
suggest it has had little effect. First, there has been no showing that
either federal or state financial cutoff statutes affect campus unrest,
although the shortness of time may be the reason for this failure.
Secondly, numerous authorities have warned that financial cutoff legislation accelerates disruption by creating another issue of governmental
suppression and university collusion against which students will demonstrate, possibly with ranks swelled by moderates.8 ' Thirdly, the greatest disruptions, those in the spring of 1970,87 came after most state and
federal cutoff legislation had been enacted. While the intensity of
these protests may be attributable to the unusual emotive appeal of the
See text accompanying notes 9-13 .supra.
3 E.g., 115 CoNG. REc. 21,646-47 (1969) (remarks of Representative Ryan).
84 SCANTON CommIssIoN RPORT, supra note 8, at 11, 91-116.
85 See S. REP. No. 1387, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968).
86 Cf. text accompanying notes 2-8 supra.
8
8

87 See note 88 infra.
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events of that year,88 they do suggest that cutoff legislation will not have
its desired effect upon violent protest.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The faults outlined above have understandably led to litigation
attacking financial cutoff provisions.8 9 In a litigation context, the
approach must shift from merely examining the advisability and effectiveness of these statutes to testing their constitutionality. 90 Many
arguments of constitutional dimension have been leveled at the statutes, 9 but only a few stand out as particularly telling and merit discussion below.
S8 Even the most carefully collected data on the 1970 spring demonstrations cannot
definitely pinpoint the cause. The Scranton Commission noted that for the 6 days
after April 30, the day President Nixon announced the Cambodia invasion, but prior
to Kent State, approximately 20 new campuses reported activity each day. Four
days after the shootings at Kent State, 100 or more new campuses reported disturbances each day. By May 10, 448 campuses were experiencing demonstrations. After
May 14 and the shootings at Jackson State, that figure rose even higher. See
SCRANTON CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-18. Though the rise in disturbances appears a response to the Kent State shootings, perhaps the large-scale demonstrations simply could not get under way until several days after the President's
speech. Alternatively, the abrupt rise may be explained as a student reaction to the
combined events.
89 Haverford College v. Reeher, Civil No. 70-2411 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1971);
United States Nat'l Student Ass'n v. Finch, Civil No. 970-69 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 16,
1969).
90 Federal court adjudication of constitutional claims, particularly those of overbreadth and vagueness, may raise an abstention problem. This is certainly true
when there exists a pending state court proceeding to determine the constitutionality
of the legislation and is possibly true when there is no pending state court proceeding.
In Haverford College v. Reeher, Civil No. 70-2411 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1971), judge
Lord, writing for the majority of a three-judge court, found no reason to abstain,
distinguishing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82 (1971), because there was no pending state court proceeding relevant to the
Pennsylvania statute.
While there may have been prior support for the proposition that abstention is
ruled out where first amendment freedoms are at stake, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); the Younger decision suggests that the district court
in Haverford College may have reached an erroneous conclusion on the abstention
issue. While Younger specifically discussed the propriety of federal court intervention
in pending state court proceedings, the opinion also dismissed the claims of those
who had not actually been prosecuted under the allegedly vague statute, their claims
being instead based on a perceived inhibition of conduct or an uncertainty as to
whether the statute applied to their conduct. In addition to cases of pending state
court proceedings, cases of the unsupported possibility of future prosecutions compel
federal court abstention under Younger. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 79 (1971).
Thus, the distinction proffered by judge Lord fails to dispose of this problem, and
federal courts may find adjudication of constitutional claims against other state
cutoff statutes foreclosed by the abstention doctrine.
91 For example, plaintiffs in Haverford College variously contended that: the
Pennsylvania statute interfered with a constitutionally protected relationship betveen
students and institutions of higher education, Brief for Plaintiff at 10, Haverford
College v. Reeher, Civil No. 70-2411 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1971); violated plaintiffs'
right of privacy, id. 15; was void for vagueness, id. 20; was unconstitutionally overbroad, id. 29; unconstitutionally chilled the exercise of first amendment freedoms,
id. 37; lacked minimal procedural due process requirements, id. 44; violated the
privilege against self-incrimination, id. 50; effected an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative and judicial power, id. 60; and violated the equal protection guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment, id. 72. Plaintiffs also contended the statute compelled a
search of their papers and effects without probable cause, id. 39.
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A. State Action
State financial aid legislation warrants constitutional scrutiny under
the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection clauses
only if the accepted state action requirements are satisfied. Many general university discipline cases searched with considerable difficulty and
often little success for state action in order to determine the fourteenth
amendment obligations of educational institutionsY2 But cutoff statutes
explicitly thrust the state into the actual disciplinary process and supply
an obviously affirmative answer to the state action question. 93
When state action is involved in a challenged proceeding, that
action must be tested against the limits imposed by the fourteenth
amendment. It appears that many cutoff provisions fail this test in
one way or another: some for vagueness, some for overbreadth, others
for lack of procedural due process, and perhaps some for denying equal
protection. Federal action, subject to the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, would be subject to the same scrutiny.
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth
Before distinguishing between vagueness and overbreadth and
illustrating where those defects appear in various cutoff statutes there is
one preliminary matter that must be considered. Financial aid statutes
do not impose traditional criminal sanctions: no jail term or fine is
imposed. A little over a decade ago, it could be said that "except for
[one exceptional case] no vagueness attack on a noncriminal statute has
succeeded." " Indeed, there is a lengthy list of cases rejecting the
vagueness rationale outside the criminal sanction area. 95
Two lines of analysis are available for disposition of this problem,
each suggesting that such a limitation is unjustified. First is the
2 See, e.g., Brown v. Mitchell, 409 F2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), aff'g as mzodified 294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y. 1968);
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; cf.
Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970). For an extensive analysis
of state action in such cases, see Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81

HIv.L. REv. 1045, 1056-64 (1968).
93
Even when the state does not command the institution to terminate aid, the

disciplinary proceeding meets the requirement. First, in statutes which predicate the
termination of aid upon violation of an institutional rule, the institutional proceeding
has been adopted by the state as the initial step in the aid denial process. Secondly,
considering the apparent responsibility to discover criminal convictions and the clear
responsibility to report institutional disciplinary hearings and aid terminations, the
delegation of information retrieval and reporting functions to the educational institutions may rise to the level of state action. Thirdly, and most important, the fact

that the state may terminate aid by reference to a violation of institutional rules
evidences state action by adoption of the content of the institutional rules. This
theory of state action is applicable not only where the state mandates or adopts the
content of the institutional rules, but also in those instances where the state requires
that educational institutions formulate a behavioral code while leaving the content of
that code to the institution.

94 Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. R~v. 67, 69-70 n.16 (1960).
95 Id.
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straightforward argument that void-for-vagueness attacks do have a
place in noncriminal proceedings. 6 This finds support in cases applying
the vagueness doctrine to strike down loyalty oath requirements when
plaintiffs risked only the loss of their jobs." The doctrine has also
been repeatedly employed in recent years to upset university regulations,
as in Stacy v. Williams, 8 where unduly vague campus speaker regulations were voided.
This rationale has been adopted in at least one district court decision involving state aid cutoff legislation. In Haverford College v.
Reeker,"9 the court, dismissing the criminal-civil distinction, concluded
that "the better view is that which finally bases [a determination of the
standard of certainty required] on the seriousness of what is at stake
under the statutory scheme."

100

The Haverford College approach should be followed because it is
more consistent with the underlying purposes and overall development
of the vagueness and overbreadth concepts '..than a simple civilcriminal distinction. Vagueness is not concerned solely with adequately
warning those to whom a statutory provision speaks, but also with
ensuring regularity of protection of diverse constitutional rights by
creating "an insulating buffer zone of added protection . . . of several

of the Bill of Rights freedoms." "02 In the education context financial
aid termination and consequent removal from academia are likely
of expression as fully and certainly as a criminal
to deter freedom
3
0

sanction.1

Speaking collectively of the vagueness and overbreadth concepts,
it would be improper to deny their application to cases suggesting a
substantial onus on first amendment rights, simply because of the lack
of criminal penalties, unless the buffer-zone function were also denied.
The latter course would require the decision to speak in absolutes, since
the only method of voiding the statute-after abandonment of vagueness and overbreadth-is direct reliance on an explicit constitutional
provision, such as the first amendment.
Yet no reason has emerged for denying courts latitude in their
manner of formulating the rationale of a constitutional decision solely
because no criminal sanctions are imposed. On the contrary, "it is the
essence and cardinal aim of due process to minimize the frequency and
gravity of those occasions, in a society, when it is necessary to reach the
96See A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
97See, e.g., Cramp v. Board of Educ., 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
98 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969) ; see id. 968 n.4 (collecting cases).
99 Civil No. 70-2411 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1971).
100 Id. at 8-9.

101 For a discussion of this development, see Note, Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
102 Id. 75.
103 Haverford College v. Reeher, Civil No. 70-2411, at 9 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1971).
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issues of ultimate power." 104 The corollaries, vagueness and overbreadth, facilitate that minimization.
Secondly, removal of financial aid can be treated as simply a penal
At least one recent case involving expulsion from college
sanction.' 0
specifically held it immaterial to a vagueness attack that the "controversy involves a disciplinary rule rather than a criminal proceeding." 108
Since removal of aid is often tantamount to expulsion, it is unlikely that
a vagueness attack will fail solely because no orthodox criminal sanction
is involved. Of course, whatever the theory, that vagueness can apply to
noncriminal proceedings does not mean that the "seriousness of what
is at stake" will not influence judicial decisions whether to apply the
1°
doctrine. 7
If vagueness is applicable in the noncriminal area, it is possible to
question some cutoff provisions on the ground that they fail to furnish
adequate warning of proscribed behavior and thereby violate the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Intimately related to inadequate warning is the fact that vague statutes provide unsatisfactory standards for enforcement, factfinding, and review, and thus
raise the spectre of discriminatory application. Adequate warning is,
of course, a cornerstone of the due process clause,' but the Court has
rarely voided statutes solely on this ground."0 9 The questions whether
the end sought by the imprecise language justifies its potential for ensnaring or deterring innocent conduct, and whether more precise,
alternative language is available to accomplish the legislative purpose,
are ones of subjective judgment "peculiarly within the responsibility
and competence of legislatures." "' Nevertheless, there are instances
where statutory uncertainty is so egregious that sound judgment,
though admittedly subjective, requires that the statutes fall.'
104 Note, Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rzv.

67, 115 (1960).
10oThe Court has tried to determine whether a statute is penal from legislative
intent. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963). Section 504 lacks
any extensive legislative history. In the absence of legislative history, the Court
has determined the nature of a statute through application of a test considering:

[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterence, whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ....
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
106 Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969).
107 Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
67, 69-70 n.16 (1960).
L. REv.
10 8 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306 (1950).
109 See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.

L. R~v. 67, 74-75 (1960).
110 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 526 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I1 ISee Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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The Florida cutoff statute presents the clearest example of "an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning . ... "1

It commences the aid termination

process 113 when a student or employee of a state institution "has participated in disruptive activities." "' Participating in a peaceful demonstration, making noise in one's dormitory, or attending a loud party may
or may not be prohibited under the statute. It is impossible to tell in
advance with any degree of certainty. In Soglin v. Kauffman,"-5 the
word "misconduct," an equally indefinite term, was held too vague a
standard under which to inflict punishment. "Disruption," in its
naked form as in the Florida provision, should fare no better."-" There
are other instances where the warning quality of cutoff statutes is open
to question. For example, when is a disruption "of a serious
nature"?

117

When is a crime one of "moral turpitude"? 118

Beyond the rudimentary criticism of the lack of warning, statutory
indefiniteness is often criticized for its potential to chill first amendment
rights." 9 Here, vagueness and overbreadth doctrines merge.120 An
overbroad law, one which inhibits or prohibits protected behavior,
usually suffers from at least a latent vagueness. When the Supreme
Court has spoken in the vagueness idiom, it has usually meant this
aspect of vagueness in an overbroad law. To this extent the doctrines
are one. They are distinct in that a statute can be extremely precise in
the vagueness-adequate warning sense and yet be void for its overly
broad sweep.12 ' Conversely, a statute that is unquestionably narrow in
the overbreadth sense may still be voided as vague." Still, particularly
in cases involving first amendment rights, 2 statutory uncertainty and
overreaching are inextricably intertwined.
Whether the vocabulary of vagueness or overbreadth is used, some
cutoff statutes suffer from potential invasions of areas protected by the
first amendment. This alone may render the statutes unconstitutionally
112 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

113 The process is completed by school recommendation to terminate aid after the
student has engaged in the prohibited behavior. FLA. STAT. ANN. §239.50 (Supp.
1971).
14 Id. § 239.581.

"15418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
116 See generally, Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1448 (1967).
STAT. ANN. § 36.46 (Supp. 1971).
"17Wis.
18 PA.STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5104.1 (Supp. 1971).
119 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 Hiev. L. REv. 844, 853-54 (1970); cf. Note, The Chilling Effect in
ConstititionalLaw, 69 COLUM. L. Rv.808, 822-26 (1969).
120 Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844,

845 n.5 (1970).
11E.g., Zwickler v.Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967).
'22 Perhaps the clearest examples are the adequate warning cases. Cases cited
note 111 supra.
1M E.g., Dombrowski v.Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v.Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
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overbroad. Often, one need not show that his behavior is constitutionally protected,' because an overbroad law's chill on free expression
of others is felt adequate justification to strike down the law even in a
factual setting not calling into play the statute's actual overbreadth.' 25
The line between an overbroad law and a valid one is at best thin,
and nearly always must be drawn in the context of a factual situation
before the court. 2 This makes it difficult to state with confidence that
a particular statute is overbroad. Once again, however, sound subjective judgment suggests some cutoff statutes are of dubious validity.
For example the Washington statute provides:
Any student who organizes and/or participates in any demonstration, riot or other activity of which the effect is to interfere with or disrupt the normal educational process at such
institution shall not be eligible for such aid.2'
The Washington provision may be saved from the void-for-vagueness
rationale applicable to the Florida statute because it at least requires
that the disruption result from a demonstration, riot, or the like. But
the statute remains susceptible to an overbreadth attack, because it
appears that a student who plans a peaceful demonstration, surely protected behavior, that turns out to "disrupt the normal educational
process" '2 will lose his financial aid. Requiring no element of intent,
the statute would penalize the planners of a peaceful demonstration if it
Because a rational student may be
effected violence or disruption.
deterred by the statute from exercising his first amendment rights,
either narrower construction or complete invalidation of the statute
is in order.
Statutes that simply use "disruptive" or "disorderly" to describe
the behavior prohibited also hover dangerously close to overbreadth.
The favored position of free expression in our society allows some minor
disruptions of daily routine to accompany it."2° Therefore, a blanket
prohibition against any disruptive or disorderly effects is likely to run
afoul of the approved standard in the demonstration area. Once again,
the detailed facts of a particular situation are likely to be determinative.
'24 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) ; Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. IREv. 844, 845 (1970) ("Such review proceeds without regard to the constitutional status of a particular complainant's conduct." (footnote omitted)).
'2G See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
2 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rxv.

844, 866-71 (1970).
ANN. § 28B.10.281 (1970).
'= Id.
129 See Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 169-70 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
10 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) ; Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941).
12T WAsH. REv. CODE
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Cutoff legislation invites vagueness and overbreadth decisions even
more openly where a university or an agency is the entity responsible
for determining whether the inherently malleable triggering words call
for application of the sanction.13 1 As recognized by the majority in
the Haverford College case, the ability of the federal judiciary to ensure
regularity in the protection of constitutional rights is substantially
diminished when factual determinations and statutory constructions are
rendered by private institutions or public agencies, rather than state or
federal courts."SS The lesser ability of federal courts to supervise these
renderings demands a broader constitutional buffer zone.
C. Procedural Due Process
Both constitutional arguments and objections to the merits of a
particular aid termination decision are of little value to an accused
student unless they can be presented in a timely manner. The lack of
provision for procedural due process in many aid termination statutes
raises the questions whether students will have the opportunity to challenge a decision in this way and whether such omission is itself a
constitutional defect.
Statutory cutoff legislation may be divided into two categories for
examination of procedural due process requirements. The first group
provides for "automatic" termination of state aid in certain specified
Such provisions are characterized by the legislative cominstances.1
mands of "must" and "shall" in mandating the termination of aid.
Typically, conviction in any court or a determination by the educational
institution that the student has disobeyed a "valid" institutional regulation resulting in a "serious disturbance" acts as the trigger mechanism
invoking the statutory command that the student's aid must be terminated.
Statutes in the second category, the "discretionary" group, are
phrased in terms of "may terminate," and vest in either a state highereducation authority"' or in the institution itself'3 5 the discretionary
131 See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
67, 94 (1960).
L.REv.
32
1
Haverford College v. Reeher, Civil No. 70-2411, at 7-8 (E.D. Pa. July 19,
1971).3 3
'1 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28B.10281 (1970)
(Any student who
engages in the proscribed activity shall not be eligible for state aid) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 116-174.2 (Supp. 1969) (Any student engaging in certain proscribed activity shall
have revoked and withdrawn from his benefit all state-supported scholarship or any
state fund); Act of June 21, 1969, ch. 48, § 8, [1969] Iowa Acts (No part of the
funds appropriated under the act shall be used to provide payments) ; Appropriation
for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1970, Pub. Act No. 307, § 17, [1969] Mich. Acts 587-88
(Aug. 12, 1969) (Any students engaging in the prohibited activity shall forfeit any
right for further benefits and the awarding authority shall immediately terminate
any assistance).
'54 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5104.1 (Supp. 1971) (Pennsylvania Higher
Education Assistance Agency).
135 E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 239.50
(Supp. 1971).
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power to terminate financial aid on a case-by-case basis.3 6 Any examination of procedural due process defects must carefully discriminate
among proceedings in which the issue for determination is the criminal
guilt or lesser misbehavior of the student, those that also determine
whether any institutional rule infraction was of a "serious or disruptive
nature," 137 and those in which aid termination is the central issue.
The "automatic" formula's failure to provide even the most rudimentary aspects of procedural due process with respect to the issue of
aid termination should not be regarded as a constitutional defect. By
statutory command, once the finding of criminal guilt or violation of an
institutional rule is established, aid termination is accomplished. Since
guilt or proscribed conduct has been determined at a prior hearing, it is
difficult to imagine what the subject matter of an aid termination hearing should be in the "automatic" category."3 8 Financial aid 'must be
terminated once a court convicts or the institution makes certain determinations. Requiring a separate hearing on the aid termination issue
would provide a forum without any possibility of substance. Any due
process claims of the student in that case must be directed at the court
proceeding or the underlying institutional disciplinary process. While
the possibility of aid termination and consequent interruption of the
educational process argue strongly for procedural fairness at any school
disciplinary proceeding, under the first statutory category they do not
require an additional hearing on the aid termination issue alone.
In contrast, statutes of the "discretionary" type vest in either a
governmental higher education authority or in the institution administering the aid the power to determine whether or not aid should be
terminated in each case. The requirement of procedural fairness in
these determinations may be analogized with that in recent Supreme
Court decisions in the public assistance area. In Goldberg v. Kelly 130
the Court held that before assistance payments could be terminated,
procedural due process requirements mandated a hearing with adequate
notice and any other requirements that might be necessary to ensure
the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. 4 ° This prior hearing was
necessary despite the statutory provision for a hearing to review the
termination decision after it had been taken. The Court singled out the
136 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1971) (Recipient of state
financial aid may be determined ineligible for further aid if he engaged in prohibited
activity); PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 24, § 5104.1 (Supp. 1971) (The higher education
authority may deny all forms of financial assistance to any student who is convicted
of a criminal violation or an institutional rule violation.) The discretionary group
also includes those statutes, which, although phrased in terms of "must!' or "shall"
terminate as are the automatic group, still require a discretionary decision by another
body on the issue of final aid termination.
137 Presumably, this might be a separate question for determination in the same
proceeding which decides whether the student has, in fact, broken the institutional
rule.
138 Perhaps the only issue that a student could raise at such a hearing would be
the defense that there had been no valid prior conviction.
139 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
140 Id.

at 267-68.
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potential harm to the aid recipient that might result from an unwarranted interruption in the orderly flow of payments.1 41 Of course, the
value of an uninterrupted flow of educational payments may lack the
emotive force which propelled the Court to safeguard the sustenance
payments in Goldberg, but nevertheless educational benefits do represent a significant economic advantage to the student, and their continued
orderly flow may in many cases be necessary for the student's uninterrupted attendance at the institution. Their importance lies in the
education which they secure, an education which enables the student
"to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, [and] to
fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of [a]
good citizen." 14 If aid is viewed in such a favorable light, the Court
could require that its receipt be protected by the same procedural
requirements that were mandated by Goldberg.
The school disciplinary cases lend additional support for the imposition of procedural fairness requirements in the "discretionary"
category. In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,43 the court
of appeals held that due process required notice and a chance to be
heard when the student faced possible dismissal from a tax-supported
institution of higher education. Dixon, and the later school discipline
cases involving a possible expulsion or suspension, have recognized the
potentially great effect that such sanctions may have on the student,'"
as well as the value to the student of remaining in continued attendance, 145 and have said that such disciplinary proceedings, when the requisite state action is found, are circumscribed, at minimum, by the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 46 Here, the consequences of aid termination are potentially as serious as those found in
the school discipline cases. This is particularly true when the statutory
scheme not only cuts off payments at the present institution but also
precludes any aid for some period in the future, no matter what institu141 Id.

at 265.

4

Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
'43294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
144 In Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), the court
noted that:
[I]n the present day, expulsion from an institution of higher learning, or
suspension for a period of time substantial enough to prevent one from
earning academic credit for a particular term, may well be, and often is in
fact, a more severe sanction than a monetary fine or a relatively brief confinement imposed by a court in a criminal proceeding.
1

'14 See, e.g., Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D.
Mich. 1969); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968). See
generally Buss, ProceduralDue Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 545, 578-79 (1971).
146 E.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Scoggin v.
Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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tion the student may be admitted to after termination of his aid by the
original school.' 47
D. Equal Protection
Equal protection objections to financial aid termination legislation
focus mainly on the unequal treatment accorded similarly situated
students. Financial aid recipients may find their aid, perhaps even
their education, 48 terminated for conduct that would merely bring institutional discipline for their wealthier contemporaries. 49 The statutes
seem grossly underinclusive: "' their limitation to only those students
who receive governmental financial assistance misses many students
engaging in campus disturbances. This underinclusiveness argument
might be easily dismissed-with the frequently reiterated proposition
that legislatures can attack problems on a piecemeal basis-were it not
for the choice of wealth as the particular basis of classification.
Accepted doctrine under the equal protection clause would suggest
an initial determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review,
strict scrutiny being accorded whenever the legislative classification is
suspect or the individual right affected is fundamental. In the case of
cutoff legislation, it might be argued that the statutes classify according
to wealth, or empirical evidence might show that application of the
statutory cutoffs had focused on racial minorities. 1 Alternatively the
courts might find a fundamental interest in obtaining higher education.
If a suspect classification or burden upon a fundamental interest were
found, unconstitutionality would follow unless the government advanced
If neither stimulus
a compelling state interest in the chosen scheme.'
147 See Wis. STAT. ANN.

§36.46 (Supp. 1971) (two-year disability period imposed for violations); cf. Act of June 21, 1969, ch. 48, § 8, [1969] Iowa Acts 54
(reexamination by admissions officer and finding that student possesses "proper
character" are requisites for reeligibility if aid terminated).
148 The purpose of many state-sponsored aid programs indicates an official awareness that many aid recipients are able to pursue an advanced education solely because
of their state aid. For example, the purpose of the Pennsylvania program of scholarships and loan guarantees is "to prevent tragic underdevelopment of human talent by
making financial assistance available to young people who might otherwise be unable
to pursue a higher education." PENNsyLV .IA HIGHER EDUCATION AssIsTANcE
AGENCY, SummARY STATIsTICs OF PHEAA PROGRAMS FOR THE 1969-70 AcADEmIc
YEAR (introductory Highlights).
149 Courts have not passed on the equal protection objections to such legislation.
In Haverford College v. Reeher, Civil No. 70-2411 (E.D. Pa., filed July 19, 1971),
the court concluded that the decision on vagueness and overbreadth had mooted
plaintiffs' argument on equal protection grounds. This reasoning seems erroneous
given the court's conclusion that the section of the Pennsylvania statute which provides for aid termination after a felony conviction was not unconstitutionally vague
or overbroad. That section would still be open to an equal protection attack.
iGo For a discussion of underinclusive classifications and the equal protection
clause, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 348-53 (1949).
151 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
152See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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to strict scrutiny were found, a statute would be found constitutional
merely upon a showing that it is designed to serve a legitimate state
interest and that the classification scheme is rationally related to the
153
purpose.
But this relatively mechanistic analysis, which has been applied by
the Court in the past, is ill-suited to constitutional exegesis. It tends to
oversimplify the process of interpreting the Constitution and to allow
too much room for the entry of subjective considerations into the decisionmaking process. The rigid dichotomy between a scheme demanding a "compelling state interest" and one demanding only a "legitimate
state interest" is too facile, and conducive to the suppression of relevant
facts, circumstances, and interests. Courts should instead engage in a
more visible and more precise balancing process to ensure the consideration and proper weighting of all relevant factors. Better results
are likely to flow from a calculus illuminating and balancing the "character of the classification in question, the relative importance to the
individuals in the class discriminated against of the government benefit
they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the
classification." 154 In essence, a precise and discriminating analysis is
advisable.
Most aid is distributed on the basis of need,'5 5 and thus the cutoff
statutes do classify according to wealth. The real question is the constitutional effect of this classification. In James v. Valtierra158 the
Supreme Court chose to ignore "an explicit classification on the basis
of poverty," ' which the dissenters thought should be viewed as a
The
suspect classification demanding exacting judicial scrutiny.5 5
Court's failure to even mention the wealth distinction in Valtierra could
be read to mean that the equal protection clause will not in the future
be used to proscribe statutory distinctions based on wealth. A more
palatable reading, not revealing quite so dramatic a reversal, would be
that the sensitivity of the Court to wealth classifications will not be of
such proportions as to automatically stimulate the sort of rigid scrutiny
previously applied to wealth classifications and racial classifications.3 9
Under this view, a wealth distinction should necessitate a weightier state
interest than, for example, one based on age, but should not lead to an
1 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
154 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
155 The Pennsylvania program requires that applicants "demonstrate a need for
financial assistance from the Commonwealth as demonstrated by the application and
income data." PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUcATIoN ASSISTANCE AGENCY, supra note
148, at 1.

156402 U.S. 137 (1971).
157Id. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15Id. at 144 (Marshall, 3., dissenting).
1-9 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (race) ; Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (race) ; Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth) ;
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (wealth) ; Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race). Although other interests and classifications were involved
on both sides in these cases, the Court's decisions were premised on those noted.
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almost automatic invalidation as the traditional strict scrutiny standard
seemed to invoke and as may be more appropriate in the racial area.
Governmental educational aid benefits are highly valuable to the
individuals whose aid might be terminated by the statutes. The courts
have often recognized both the economic benefits flowing from an advanced education and the social and civic advantages which accrue to
the student as a result of his education. 6 ' Considered on a somewhat
abstract level, the value of education is closely analogous to that which
the courts have attached to access to other governmental assistance
payments. A blanket assertion of the high value of education, however,
should not preclude judicial examination of the value of a governmentally subsidized education, for while the value of education stands
as a general proposition, the value of having that education financed
through state or federal aid will vary according to the availability of
alternative means of financing.
Alternative options available to the individual student undercut
the critical importance of state or federal aid. The availability of
financial aid from private sources may provide an alternative to state
aid. New plans for the repayment of present educational loans through
the future earnings of the student may provide readily available aid for
any student willing to undertake the responsibility of repayment. Under
the contingent repayment plan, for example, in return for money borrowed the student agrees to repay a certain percentage of his future
income, rather than the amount of the principal and interest at a fixed
rate.' 61 Long-term loan programs may also provide an alternative,
although such plans themselves work an extreme hardship on students
from low-income families." s To the extent that such alternative
methods of educational finance are available, the impact of state or
federal aid termination is minimized for the individual. Under this
analysis the benefit denied to the class as a result of the allegedly discriminatory legislation is not the opportunity of achieving a higher
education, but of having that education financed by governmental
sources rather than private financial sources. The courts must examine
options available to individual students to accurately assess the impact
of state and federal aid termination and appropriately assign a value to
this factor in the equal protection balance.
310OE.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Zanders v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 754 (W.D. La. 1968); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).

361 For a discussion of contingent repayment plans, see JOINT EcONOwlC COMm.,
91sT CONG., 1ST SEss., THE EcoNomics AND FINANClNG OF HIGHEm EDUCATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 88-92 (Jt. Comm. Print 1969).
162 Heavy reliance upon loans might seriously impede low-income students. It
has been suggested that "to ask young persons from low-income and minority backgrounds to assume [substantial indebtedness] to get through a program of higher
education presents a formidable barrier." The low-income student's career possibilities are likely to be significantly less remunerative, thus rendering repayment
more difficult. Id. 626.
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The asserted government interest for the statutory classification is
the preservation of order on college and university campuses so as
to maintain an environment suitable for academic endeavors. This is
undoubtedly a permissible legislative objective, although it is doubtful
that it is of the same level of necessity and seriousness that courts
have previously required when the "suspect classification" analysis is
found to apply.yn The importance, in an equal protection analysis, to
be accorded this government interest should depend in part on the
effectiveness of the cutoff legislation in serving it, as well as the availability of less drastic means. 6 ' The government should have the burden
of proving the effectiveness, a burden that may well be difficult to carry,
as our earlier analysis should indicate.
In summary, the individual interest at stake is that of a governmentally financed higher education, and alternative means of finance
may dilute the importance of that interest. The asserted state interest
is a significant one, and while it may not be as compelling as those required for other "suspect" classifications, it will be sufficient in some
cases. The ultimate equal protection decision as to any particular piece
of legislation should probably depend upon the availability of other
means of finance, which may well vary from time to time and area to
area, and upon government proof of the effectiveness and necessity of
cutoff legislation to achieve the goal of stemming campus disorders.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional defects and policy infirmities of state and federal
financial aid withdrawal statutes evidence their hasty drafting and illconsidered adoption. Certainly the most telling criticism of the legislation is that it cannot be shown to have dampened campus disturbances.
In addition, in its intrusion into academic disciplinary procedures, the
legislation has imposed measurable administrative burdens on the institutions and raised the possibility of significant educational deprivation
for many students. The legislation should be dealt with as the Scranton
Commission recommended: additional legislation should not be enacted,
present legislation in the form of riders should be allowed to expire, and
permanent legislation should be repealed.
Gregory D. Keeney
63

E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

104See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 528 (1970)
ing) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).

(Marshall, J., dissent-

